

Part III

**of Concept Paper on tolerance enhancing
measures in rural Tajikistan**

for GTZ:

Conceptual Approach to Foster
Tolerance in Rural Tajikistan

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Conceptual approach to foster tolerance in rural Tajikistan

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Tolerance in word and tolerance in deed

Tajik society is a society in deep crisis. Conflicts about the distribution of material, social and spiritual resources are the typical state of affairs in most societies. In times of crisis, the institutions in place processing and regulating conflicts are, however, tested to the utmost. We have argued that the conflicts at issue and the capacity of institutions processing conflicts are the key determinants for conflict escalation and conflict resolution. Issues, capacities and sometimes even institutions change over time. In times of crises and accelerated change of the environment pressure on adaptation and innovation on those institutions is mounting. If they fail to adapt, if they prove incapable of dynamic stability (stabilising their functionality by structurally adapting to new challenges) they fail.

Understanding the conflicts at issue and the institutions dealing with them and keeping track of changes in this process must be the starting point for all development initiatives targeting peaceful conflict resolution and seeking to foster tolerance norms in the way social groups deal with each other. This is particularly important but also particularly difficult in rural regions in Tajikistan where official institutions are either weakly developed or lack legitimacy (or both) and where informal and traditional local institutions are left to deal with arising conflicts.

Tolerance as a norm is of particular importance for the way people in Tajikistan are making sense of conflicts and of their opponents in conflict. Social acceptance of the existence of other positions, other values other habits and traditions are a precondition to avoid displacement, ideologisation and radicalisation of conflicts over resources. Tolerance in this regard, as a norm, has to be transmitted via education.

Tolerance as a practice is closely linked to the way incentives of actors are structured. **Tolerance as a practice** in conflicts pays when there are institutions in place awarding such practice with prestige, moral or material gains; practical tolerance also pays when intolerance is punished - morally or physically. These institutions may be local informal institutions exerting social control, they may also be state institutions. Practical tolerance in dealing with competing groups may be backed by tolerance norms; if tolerance works for the interest of groups involved it can, however, also work without normative backing and may even be protected by intuitions otherwise considered as rather intolerant in normative terms (e.g. religious authorities or elders charged with guarding the moral core of the community,

protecting at the same time the tolerance-practice of hospitality even in relation to adversaries).

Education: learning tolerance?

If tolerance is defined as the willingness and ability to accept human diversity education is key. It is key in order to transport awareness of difference in the first place. This is particularly true for rural society. The soviet educational system, despite the fact that it promoted in part rather intolerant values, did provide for this awareness; it also promoted tolerance norms between officially accepted social groups of the USSR. This system has crumbled. The tolerance values tailored to the social engineering of the USSR lost relevance today.

Values fostering tolerance that may be of relevancy today should focus on the following issues (inspired by the presentation of the Humanities Project for Central Asia of Rafique Keshavjee):

- Humanities studies
- Respect of difference
- Pluralism within traditions
- Respect for rational dissent
- Participatory decision making
- Mediation
- Moral training of government workers with special focus on resource distribution

There are two main tendencies related to intolerance in Tajik society of today that can be countered with meaningful education:

1. The believe that only someone from ones own region can be trusted and may serve ones interest.
2. The absence of a feeling of participating in ones own future.

Education may foster awareness of choice. However, concrete (material or other) incentives for intolerant behaviour can usually not be countered by promoting normative ideas about

“good behaviour” only. In addition, tolerance must pay, t.i. tolerance norms must be protected by institutions, and intolerant strategies of achieving ones aims must be credibly sanctioned.

Social control / community self-policing: enforcing tolerance?

The self-policing abilities of communities is key for peaceful conflict management in particular in remote rural communities where the state is absent, only selectively functional (e.g. in terms of military or police presence) or looked upon as illegitimate. Can social control also foster tolerance norms?

Social control is essential to reinforce the moral rules of the community, to protect the authority of traditional leaders and, maybe most importantly, to keep in check conflict that is not played by the rules (e.g. young men using force to shortcut access to resources traditionally controlled by older men) and sanction deviation. The sanction capacity of all institutions dealing with conflict-control are crucial. They may be physical (beating, expulsion, killing), material (compensation, burning down of property) and moral. In terms of social control the latter is the most commonly used form of sanctioning: the threat of loosing face, of falling out with the community, of loosing prestige. In societies with a strong notion of collective (family) honour and shame such sanctions can be particularly threatening.

There are, however, some risks involved in relying on this particular social capital of communities to control their conflicts:

- Community self-policing can go both ways – social in-group control is necessary to organise, to channel and to avoid violence; therefore, tolerance norms guiding organisational capacities towards the non-violent processing of conflict and towards the acceptance of social groups outside the socially controlled one is essential.
- Scale – social control, if functional, usually only applies to rather small we-groups (*kishlak*, *avlod*, clan, tribe; possibly also a small, economically interdependent region and overseeable elite networks). The problem is that the often sophisticated moral rules enabling peaceful conflict regulation inside the group are non-transferable to outside groups, a phenomenon that has been controversially called “amoral familism” for some Mediterranean, Balkan and Caucasian societies. Effectively enforced internal cohesion of such we-groups can easily turn into effectively organised collective and morally unconstrained violence against outside groups.

Therefore, even in stateless societies other institutions usually develop in order to back-up large-scale peaceful social relations – like institutionalised rules for inter-group feuding and inter-group solidarity (e.g. *adat* in the Caucasus, *Fehderecht* in medieval Europe), and, more effectively, universal codes of justice ideologically and practically independent of the social control of the “eye of the village” (the social control of face-to-face we-groups). Two such legal systems of reference not necessarily depending on an enforcing state are the *Shari’a* and, on a smaller scale, the institution of *Dzhamaat* in Dagestan.

- Loss of context: when segments of society capable of strict internal control are forced to move to other areas or to urban environments the internal organisational capacities excluding integration of or even with outside society, can be highly disruptive for both, the migrating segment and the host-communities.

Social control or community self-policing may therefore be locally effective in controlling internal conflicts; it is, however, unrealistic to expect these local informal institutions to protect generalised tolerance norms in dealing with anonymous social groups perceived as others. Social control is designed and may be functional in settings where people and groups know each other. Tolerance by definition extends to the abstract other, the unknown and different. This is a social field, however, that is usually not covered by social control.

No tolerance without the state...

In result, the establishment of tolerance as a general value and as a commonly accepted social practice depends on some conditions usually exercised by functioning states:

- A monopoly of violence that guarantees and if needed enforces non-violent conflict resolution, at least in significant parts of the country (*gewaltfreie Räume*); this is precondition to
 - diminishing fears between socially unconnected groups
 - establishing trust between groups not tied together by direct social control, and
 - make unspecific reciprocity between unrelated social groups possible (delivery of goods, services, information without expecting an immediate and equal compensation for it).

Only with repression of violent options to deal with conflicts, with diminished fear and institutionalised trust can tolerance pay as a strategy for socially relevant groups in dealing with one another.

...but plenty of intolerance with the wrong state

While core functions of statehood may be essential for tolerance to stand a chance against more destructive forms or dealing with difference in complex societies, the organisational might of state-power is frequently used to effectively destroy tolerance norms and foster intolerance and mistrust against other groups. Attempts to establish tolerance bottom-up against an unwilling, powerful state are futile. The Tajik state of today appears to be neither unwilling – tolerance in opposition to violent protest or contest is in the best interest of the ruling elite who emerged as thus far undisputed winner of the civil war and could only loose from renewed hostilities -, nor powerful enough to significantly undermine or reinforce tolerance in rural Tajikistan.¹

¹ Compare the argument on essential state-building for any kind of guided and sustainable development for the case of Afghanistan Wimmer 2002, April; Korf 2001

MSDSP: Its potential for Conflict Prevention

It is not the purpose of this chapter to deliver an overall evaluation of MSDSP's (Mountain Societies Development Support Programme) work. Rather, **we discuss potential risks and opportunities of MSDSP's current and future work with regard to tolerance promoting and conflict prevention measures.**

There are three aspects of MSDSP activities that account for MSDSP's large potential impact on conflict and stability:

- MSDSP is the key resource provider in 3 structural very weak regions. Many villages are to a large extent dependent on MSDSP (and other international donors). A sudden exit or even a gradual curb on resource input will without doubt destabilize the situation
- MSDSP has involuntarily taken over many a task that is usually within the realm of the state. This raises expectations on the part of the population and gives rise to jealousy on the part of the state. Both can be dangerous.
- MSDSP is fostering rapid institutional change at the local level. Times of rapid institutional change are always times of increased risk of violent conflict.

MSDSP is rapidly growing and on the verge of organisational and institutional reforms. We strongly feel that every reform design for MSDSP should seriously consider whether the proposed steps actually promote or prevent conflict. **What may be a sound strategy from an organisational perspective may prove risky within a broader socio-political context.**

This chapter has five sections:

Section one very briefly describes the main activities of MSDSP (Mountain Societies Development Support Programme). MSDSP is one of the most important implementing partners of GTZ.

Section two analyses the potential opportunities and risks of the current activities of MSDSP with regard to conflict/stability.

Section three briefly describes proposed organisational changes of MSDSP.

Section four analyses the potential opportunities and risks of these proposed organisational changes of MSDSP with regard to conflict/stability.

Section five summarizes the risks of MSDSP's current and future works with regard to conflict/stability and gives recommendations.

The chapter is based on the following literature and documents

- Mountain Societies Development Support Programme, Five Year Strategy 2002 – 2006, Khorog , April 2002 (MSDSP 2002).
- Mountain societies Development Support Programme – MSDSP, Gorno-Badachschan, Tajikistan: Institutional Development Proposals on behalf of the GTZ, Khorog, August 2002, report compiled by Dr. Niklaus Schall (Schall 2002, August).
- Projektevaluierung. ESP Gorno-Badakhchan, Tadschikistan. Hauptbericht. (Stabstelle 04, Interne Evaluierung), (Börgel, Gaschütz 2000, September).
- A Manual For Conducting Conflict Management Seminars at the Local-level. (Community Development Unit, Central Office, January 2003) The Community Development Unit is financed by GTZ under the 'Promotion of Tolerance and Cooperation on Community Level Project' (MSDSP 2003, January).
- Community Development Unit Proposal to the GTZ for July 2002 to December 2002 (AKF, MSDSP 2002).
- Institutional Development Beyond the Village: A Charter for the Development Committees in the Rasht Valley (MSDSP, UNDP 2002, November).

and on intensive discussions with:

- Khaleel A. Tetlay, Acting Manager Community Development Unit (CDU) of MSDSP
- MSDSP district office staff in Garm
- MSDSP district office staff in Shurabad
- Participants of the Workshop on March 15 (see Appendix)
- Yodgor Faizov, General Manager, MSDSP
- Discussion with VO-Representatives in villages in the vicinity of Faisabad, Garm, Tajikabad, Jirgatal, Shurabad

MSDSP's main activities today

Mountain Societies Development Support Programme (MSDSP) was established in 1993 as a partner-implementing organisation by the Aga Khan Foundation, within the framework of

humanitarian assistance to the Gorno-Badaghshan Region. MSDSP has, since 1995, also acted through the Aga Khan Foundation as a partner- implementing organisation for GTZ.

The initial objective of MSDSP was to ensure food security for the population of the Autonomous Region of Gorno-Badaghshan. MSDSP has achieved this immediate objective through the Humanitarian Assistance Programme, which has brought in emergency food aid, and through the Agriculture Reform Programme, which has focused on land privatisation, expansion of arable land and the provision of technical aid and credit services.

In 1997, MSDSP expanded its agriculture programme to the Karategin and Tavildara valleys (which form the so called Garm Region, consisting of the districts of Darband, Garm, Tajikabad, Djirgatal, Tavildara, Faizabad and Rogun).

In 2002 MSDSP started to work in the Shurabad district of Khatlon Region.

MSDSP currently works in three regions of Tajikistan (Gorno-Badaghshan, Garm and Shurabad). It operates in a total of 540 Village Organisations in 21 districts. MSDSP plans to grow. In 2008 it plans to work in a total of app. 770 Village Organisations.

Programme activities in all regions have moved away from a single focus on food self-sufficiency, and now deal increasingly with the broader long-term economic and social development of the region.

MSDSP works with a community mobilisation approach. The central channel for most activities are community based grass roots Village Organisations (VO). According to MSDSP (MSDSP 2002: 6), “the philosophy underpinning the Village Organisation Programme is that rural economic development is best catalysed and sustained through village level institutions that are autonomous and transparent, contributing to democratic norms of behaviour and to the growth of civil society. Through this initiative, villagers are learning self-reliance, and village organisations are facilitating the mobilisation of human, physical and financial resources to empower local villagers, give them greater ownership of development activities and generate wealth”.

MSDSP uses a structured participatory village level mobilising and planning process to build, step-by-step, over five years, the capacity of the community to analyse village resources, plan together as a group, access resources, implement activities and assess impacts. MSDSP calls this process the Village Development Planning Process (VDPP).

The VDPP itself is primarily a means of organising and structuring MSDSP’s interaction with village communities and individual households.

During the initial stage of the participatory planning process a three year village management plan, including a long-term vision for the future, will be formulated and documented for each community to provide a transparent and efficient mechanism for allocation of project grants.

The VDPP consists of five stages (temporal sequences).

- (1) Stage one is *Village Identification*, which includes visits and discussion with different segments of local population in order to assess the need of the population and in order to assess the willingness to form a Village Organisation
- (2) Stage two is *Community entry* and consists of an awareness campaign and of a stakeholder analysis.
- (3) Stage three is the actual formation of a *Village Organisation*. This takes place when app. 80% of the households express their willingness to form a Village Organisation.

The villagers should select leadership in a democratic way and it should be made clear that the leadership is answerable and accountable only to the members. There are two leadership positions: a VO President and a VO Manager. If there is a savings programme within the VO, then a position of an Accountant is required. The Village Organisations often form committees on agriculture, education, construction, livestock, finances and education. These committees correspond to the committees that exist at the district state administration (*hukumat*). Later on other VO specialists may be selected for training under MSDSP's training programmes. Once a village general body meeting has been held and the leadership selected, then the VO is formally 'registered' when it submits an application to MSDSP saying that it wants to enter into a development partnership with MSDSP. The application should be signed by all the VO leaders and members. MSDSP and the VO keep copies of this application.

- (4) Stage four is the *Analysis and Planning phase*. This consists of a structured process that produces detailed information of the needs of the village and the available resources and capacities. Then the VO decides by open voting about the priorities.
- (5) Stage five is the *implementation phase*. Activities are training of beneficiaries in project management, implementation of micro-development activities in the village

The VOs the consultants have visited have set different priorities. However, usually among the key priorities of villages in Garm and

Shurabad are restoration of electricity and water systems, restoration of school buildings, restoration or construction of roads that connect villages to arable land or pastures, restoration of youth centres. The restoration of mosques were in none of the visited villages among the first three priorities.

(6) Stage six is *review, re-planning and maintenance*

The results achieved are impressive. Although this report is not a systematic evaluation of MSDSP, the consultants feel that it should be mentioned that they were impressed by MSDSP achievements. Resources are reaching the village, and within the village also the poorest segments of the population. MSDSP produces tangible results; its record in providing food security on the Gorno-Badaghshan Region is impressive. MSDSP enjoys wide acceptance and respect among the population of the regions where it operates. The staff both at the centre and at district level is highly motivated and professional. The consultants feel that one of the major assets of MSDSP is the genuine commitment of MSDSP management to be a transparent and learning organisation

MSDSP works through Village Organisations. These Village Organisations are *de jure* informal, voluntary ad-hoc organisations and as such are not part of MSDSPs organisational structure. Some Village Organisations have by now registered as public organisations, some have not. However, the Tajik law on public organisations is not very clearly defined. So even for those Village Organisations that have registered, it is not clear what duties and rights come along with the status of a public organisation. This is problematic, given the fact that Village Organisations, with the help of MSDSP, invest in infrastructure that usually would be state owned or publicly owned. Village Organisations are therefore operating in a legal vacuum, and it is not clear who controls the property rights on their investments and assets. This is even more problematic given the fact that Village Organisations are often a substitute for the state. (Interview with Yodgor Faizov, General Manager MSDSP, March 5, 2003)

Although Village Organisations are informal voluntary organisations, MSDSP clearly defines the way Village Organisations are formed, and MSDSP defines the procedures by which these Village Organisations govern themselves: MSDSP expects at least 80% of all households of a village to take part in the Village Organisations. It expects the chairman and the manager to be elected, and the vice-chairman, the accountant and the chairwoman of the women's

committee to be approved by the Village Organisation. The Village Organisation may then decide to pay a salary to their management. The resource would come from the VO's own budget, which stems from membership fees and donations.

After the Village Organisation has been formed, the Village Development Planning Process (VDPP) is initiated. Once a participatory assessment of available resources and needs has been carried out, the Village Organisation decides by voting (when asked, it turned out that this voting is mostly an open vote) about its three key priorities for the next three years. It then seeks to implement these priorities with the help of MSDSP structure and programmes. At this stage, the Village Organisation links with the MSDSP district office.

The Village Organisation communicates its priorities to the MSDSP district office.

In every district where MSDSP operates it runs a district office. MSDSP district offices typically consist of a district manager, one accountant, one engineer, one veterinarian, one or two agronomists and support staff.

The district office rejects or approves the project. In case of approval, the district office helps the implementation of the project, either using its own resources or by linking the Village Organisation with other donor organisations. In case the projects exceed a certain financial threshold, then it is forwarded to the next level, the regional office. According to one respondent (March, 3, Tajikabad, Garm Region), the MSDSP district office can decide on projects with a financial volume of up to USD 500. Projects exceeding that amount are dealt with by the MSDSP regional offices, which can decide on projects up to 10.000 USD. Projects exceeding that sum are dealt with by MSDSP headquarters.

Opportunities and risk of MSDSP's current activities with regard to conflict/stability

Village Organisation and MSDSP clearly fill a vacuum both in terms of resources and in terms of institutions that have emerged with the collapse of the Soviet state. The newly founded Tajik state has not (yet?) been able to fill in this vacuum. As already mentioned, state institutions are de facto absent below the level of the district administration. Villages are thus often governed by non-state institutions. There exist three types of institutions:

- traditional and informal institutions,

- run-down left-overs and semi-privatised remnants of Soviet institutions (most importantly former collective farms, schools, medical points, sometimes sport-facilities) and
- newly emerging and externally sponsored institutions

Perhaps the most important of the new institutions are the MSDSP sponsored Village Organisations.

Tajikistan is certainly still a “crisis society” that is undergoing dramatically rapid social and institutional change. MSDSP is, through resource input and through the creation of Village Organisation, a powerhouse of institutional change.

This change brings with it many **opportunities**: On the bright side of these MSDSP sponsored institutional changes, we may note:

- The Village Organisations represent a new social resource for village people, through which they can access ideas and financial resources.
- Village Organisations enable villages to join other social networks. For example, initially only

MSDSP worked with Village Organisations; now other organisations (in AKDN and outside) are using (and planning to use) the Village Organisation network.

- Village Organisations increase a village’s capacity for collective action and collective responsibility.
- Village Organisations enhance the participation of women in community life, since there is always a representative of the female population within the Village

Institutions can be defined as the rules of the game. They define who plays what game with what rules.

Institutions perform three functions, which are relevant for conflict promotion/prevention

Firstly institutions are accepted, trained and sometimes enforced patterns of interaction, which can frame conflicts. Conflict potentials can thus be defused. The breakdown of such a framework may enable the risk factors to ‘go active’. As a rule all societies have institutions in place that can deal with conflicts in a way that contains violent disputes by fostering compromises in favour of alternative conflicts. At the local level and in “stateless” societies, crosscutting networks of loyalty or traditional mediators (such as councils of elders or religious authorities) perform such conflict prevention tasks.

Secondly, the institutional framework provides the incentive structure for local actors and thus determines their strategic action. Institutions can thus not only prevent violence, but they can also promote violence, if the incentive structure is ‘badly’ designed. For example: If the institutions are such that cheating pays more than playing by the rules, some people will start to cheat, which leads to conflict.

Thirdly, institutions have distributional effects. They determine the access to resources. Resources are crucial with regard to conflict/stability first, because people compete for scarce resources, and secondly, because the organisation of violence requires access to considerable resources (manpower, fuel, weapons, moral authority among followers).

(Definition taken from Koehler, Zürcher 2003)

Organisation management, and women have a vote in Village Organisation elections and voting.

- Village Organisations have their own procedures such as elections and voting. By this, essential social skills such as collective decision making, acceptance of binding procedures, respect of accountability, participation and transparency are trained and rewarded.
- MSDSP is seen as transparent, impartial and non-state. This prestige is an important asset!

However, institutional change affects the very mechanism by which society deals with conflict. Institutions can prevent violence; they can also, if badly designed, promote violence. Institutional change is always risky. MSDSP's activities may in numerous ways increase the risk of conflict in the long run. We do not predict that conflict is unavoidable. But we feel that the following issues may bring along **risks** and deserve **close monitoring**:

- MSDSPs activities increase food security and in general social security. A continuous modestly growing income leads to growing expectations about the future. Usually, expectations grow quicker than real income. The widening gap between slowly growing incomes and rapidly growing expectations is conflict prone. In other words: starving men do not revolt. But men with unfulfilled expectations may. Therefore, increased food security does not always correspond to increased stability. Social science has shown that societies experience the greatest risk for conflict when they move quickly from "very poor" to "less poor" categories (see [scheme III](#)).
- MSDSP's activities increase the relative dependence on external donors. If these inputs were abruptly reduced, then the consequence might be bitter conflict. In other words: Men who do not expect to get much in the future will not revolt. Men who expect that they may lose what they recently acquired may fight to keep what they have.
- MSDSP's activities increase the capacity for effective collective action. What if a Village Organisation prioritises that it would be best to take over the pasture of a neighbouring village?

- Village Organisations work through procedure (voting, elections). These procedures require that conflicts are dealt with in the open. For example, in a village that the consultants have visited there was a disagreement on whether to build a mosque or to refurbish a youth centre. The procedures of the Village Organisation require that the members of the Village Organisation put forward their arguments during an open meeting and then decide by voting. In that particular case, the faction that wanted the mosque actually lost to the faction that wanted to refurbish the youth centre. By traditional standards, this open defeat of the “religious established” vs. the “secular youth” is outrageous and would never have happened, had the village dealt with this issue in a traditional way. Nobody would have even asked the young men for their opinion. The voting procedure shifted power from the group of the “religious and older” to the group of the “younger and secular”. The “religious” faction openly announced that they disapprove of the procedure itself. Thus, the final outcome – a voting victory of the younger - may increase tensions between groups and may lead to hostility towards the institution representing and implementing the new procedures.
- Institutional change can produce winners and losers (zero-sum-game). Among the losers may be: religious authorities, older generations, state institutions (such as *jamoat* administration, *mahalla* committees, farmers associations or the management of state owned farms (*goskhoz*, former *kolkhoz*). Discontent among groups whose influence in the village decreases may lead to tensions.
- MSDSP’s activities may weaken traditional institutions. When those institutions that traditionally deal with mediation and conflict management lose their grip on society, the risk of conflict may increase. The situation seems especially tense when traditional mediators lose influence, and the state is (not yet) in place.
- MSDSP has limited experience in operating in explicitly multi-ethnic regions (with the exceptions of Jirgatal in upper Rasht Valley and Shurabad region where work has just started and ethnic identification appears to be weak). It is planning to extend its activities in such regions in the Khatlon province. In a multi-ethnic environment, all of the above mentioned issues apply even more. Rapid institutional change may bring along winners and losers. In a multi-ethnic environment, such shifts in influence get easily interpreted with an ethnic flavour (ethnicised).
- Supplanting the state is always risky. A NGO may take over some state tasks for a certain period of time. However, it cannot and should not replace the state. There is no

alternative to a legitimate state monopoly on violence. Ironically, MSDSPs success may lead to a situation when growing and unrealistic expectations of the population and growing “jealousy” on part of the state apparatus will make it very difficult for it to remain impartial and apolitical.

Proposed organizational changes of MSDSP

MSDSP has been growing rapidly and plans to grow further, both spatially and functionally. It already is one of the key providers of assistance in Garm and Gorno-Badaghshan, it operates in Shurabad district (Khatlon) and has plans to expand to other region of Tajikistan, too. MSDSP currently considers its future strategy that will without doubt involve internal institutional and organisational change.

Any future strategy for MDSPP needs to clarify the following questions:

1. **Exit Option:** how can it be ensured that that Village Organisations will be able to continue to work independently, once the life-line relationship between MSDSP and individual Village Organisation is diminishing? And what is the future for the Village Organisations? Is it unification of individual Village Organizations to larger units?
2. **Link up with State:** what institutional links between Village Organisations (in their present form or in a new form) and government agencies should be created, and on what level (jamoat, district, regional) should they be created?
3. **Decentralisation:** what will be the organisational and institutional consequences for MSDSP? What functions will MSDSP retain and what functions will it delegate?
4. **Impact on Stability / Conflict:** what is the likely impact of exit, link up and decentralisation on stability within society?

During intense discussions with MSDSP management, the consultants gained the impression that MSDSP, drawing on its experience, and assisted by external consultants, is carefully and skilfully considering options with regard to 1, 2, and 3.

However, the consultants feel that issue 4 (Impact on Stability / Conflict: what is the likely impact of exit, link up and decentralisation on stability within society) deserves more attention than it is given at present.

We now turn to a brief description of proposals for organisational changes of MSDSP before discussing its possible impact on conflict / stability.

One option that MSDSP is considering, assisted by external experts, is the creation of a **Union of Village Organisations at the district level** (cf. Schall 2002, August).

The key elements of this reform proposal are:

1 The creation of a Union of Village Organisations at the district or rayon level.

Individual Village Organisations will form a Union. This Union will register as an NGO and would be owned by the people.

According to the proposal a governing body or assembly that is made up of one representative from each Village Organization, and an executive body that is headed by a president or a chief executive officer will govern these Unions of Village Organisations.

It is also proposed that the current district offices of MSDSP could form the nucleus of the executive of the proposed Union. This approach would ensure that the district organizational structure serves the needs and requirements of the Union of Village Organizations.

The proposal recommends the creation of the Union at the district level rather than at the sub-district level for the following main reasons: There would still be too many unions that would have to be formed at the sub-district (i.e. Jamoat level); Unions formed at the sub-district level would be difficult to amalgamate at the district level at a later stage; the organisational development required of the unions would stretch resources too thinly. It would be difficult to establish a single development fund for all sub-districts if the unions are formed at the sub-district level.

The objectives of the district-based union of Village Organisations could be to provide a forum for:

- effectively and independently lobbying for funds at the regional (oblast) and national levels (thus reducing dependency on MSDSP)
- a better coordination between the Village Organisations
- prioritising problems between the various councils in the Rayon
- developing better formulated project proposals which can then be forwarded either to the government, NGOs, donors or the private sector at the regional (oblast) and national level

2 Creating and administering a Rayon (district) Development Fund (RDF)

Various international donors and eventually the government will provide resources to a so-called Rayon Development Fund. The fund will be a pool of money from which Village Organisations can fund development activities that they have prioritised and agreed upon.

The RDF will allow the donors and NGOs to pool their resources at the district level and to enable the Village Organisations to access the fund.

Representatives of the government would be part of the board of the Rayon Development Fund, but they would neither completely control nor dominate it.

Decisions on which project will be funded would be reached by a three step process, in which three bodies take part:

- A first vote within the Union of Village Organizations over which projects they wish to propose for financing from the RDF
- A second vote would be undertaken within the District development committee. This is a committee where the administration, Village Organisations and donors are equally represented. District Development Committees have the task to coordinate development activities between donor organizations, the state and beneficiaries. The establishment of such committees is currently fostered by the UNDP and in some cases receives experimental backing from MSDSP).
- A third vote would then take place in the district parliament (*majlis*)

3 A Modified Role and Function for MSDSP

If the proposal of creating a Union of Village Organisations at the district level is implemented, then this will have far reaching organisational and institutional consequences for MSDSP. In terms of institutional development MSDSP would be structured in a way that it can assist communities to develop strong village organisations and a Union of Village Organisations at the district level that is linked to a Rayon Development Fund that can be accessed by the Union members.

MSDSP will initiate the creation of Unions of Village Organisations at the Rayon level. The current district structure of MSDSP will form the executive or secretariat of the newly formed Unions. The Unions will be encouraged to register as independent NGOs. MSDSP will initiate the creation of a Rayon Development Fund, with all of its operational requirements. The fund will be at the disposal of the Unions at the Rayon level.

Once this is achieved, MSDSP core functions will be reduced to training, capacity building of the Village Organisations and the Unions of Village Organisations.

With this end in mind, MSDSP will establish a **Community Development Unit**. The unit will undertake all of the necessary training of the Village Organisations and particularly of the Unions of Village Organisations and of the Rayon Development Fund.

The basic structure of MSDSP will thus consist of two main units:

- The **Administration and Management unit**; and
- The **Community Development Unit** in which the majority of work and effort will be concentrated.

MSDSP has, during 2002, established the Community Development Unit. Its main objectives are, according to MSDSPs five-year strategy plan, “to

- document and disseminate detailed information on the development approach, lessons learnt and success stories to all partners involved in the program and to other agencies implementing community development programs
- hold workshops and seminars for all partners involved in the program with the aim of continuously developing the approach on the basis of feed-back from practitioners in the field
- train partners in the development approach and areas of technical expertise related to programme implementation

- continuously update the training programme and documented materials on the basis of lessons learnt and to strive to develop and disseminate innovative solutions to problems with particular reference to conflict prevention
- establish and maintain a formal network of agencies involved in community development and publish regular network bulletins
- provide institutional development services to nascent national NGOs.”

MSDSP argues that

“the rationale for the unit is based on the present lack of co-ordination and networking between agencies working in community development in Tajikistan, the lack of an established forum and resource centre for promoting innovative and sustainable approaches, and the lack of training facilities aimed at partners working in community development at the field level. While some agencies do provide training, it tends to be abstract, and only in a workshop setting. The MSDSP unit would seek to learn and teach directly from the field by holding its training programmes at the field level (e.g. in Khorog, Garm, Shurabad) rather than in the Capital - though some national workshops would clearly need to be held in Dushanbe. Moreover, it is hoped that at least some of the training would be in the form of community-to-community training where peer learning is encouraged as a powerful form of exposure and learning through demonstration. The ideas from the Aga Khan Foundation’s support to field-based learning centres in India, Kenya and Pakistan will be adopted for use in Tajikistan.” (MSDSP 2002).

Potential risks of proposed organizational changes

We stress that we do not evaluate the merits of these proposed organisational changes as a whole. What we do is merely draw attention to possible impacts on stability/conflict. We see four issues that may actually increase risk of conflicts:

Decentralization of decision-making is risky

MSDSP currently works effectively. Resources are reaching the village, and the village participates in shaping its own future. Any institutional change should not endanger this achievement.

Decentralisation in principle is a means to empower communities to decide themselves on how they would like to use their resources. Crucially, communities should have a say in how they would like to spend part of the taxes they produce and collect. However, at present and in the foreseeable future, there are no public resources whatsoever generated at local level. Such resources come exclusively from external donor organisations and in theory from central state budget transfers.

Decentralisation of decision-making processes in a situation in which resources come exclusively from external donor organisations may prove dysfunctional: it may well lead to increased competition and lobbying between the beneficiaries about scarce resources. While competition for resources according to accepted rules is certainly not a bad thing and might raise standards, uncontrolled competition for scarce key-resources according to new rules of the game arcane to existing village institutions is a risky business.

Risk of fostering competition

The creation of Unions of Village Organisations in every district promotes competition between these Unions. Resources are scarce, and every Union will have to lobby the donors in order to secure their share of the cake. The promotion of inter-district competition in a war-torn society with strong regionalist tendencies bears a significant risk. It will be especially risky when MSDSP starts to operate in regions where the population is heterogeneous (e.g., multi-ethnic population, or regions inhabited jointly by communities with a different regional background, like in the especially problematic cotton-monoculture regions of Khatlon where inhabitants from different backgrounds were settled on state initiative since the 50s).

Risk of increased need for lobbying

It may be true that MSDSP grows leaner and more cost efficient by decentralising some decision making power to the Unions. However, the costs of lobbying may be high for these Unions. Technical aid may not be effectively used when the staff of the Unions of Village Organisations are permanently engaged in competition with other Unions and in lobbying for

scarce resources from donors. Thus the creation of Unions of Village Organisations may lead to higher overall costs and thus reduce the efficiency of the donor activity.

Complicated decision-making process

The proposed decision making process is very complicated. It involves three voting procedures within three different bodies (whose members may be overlapping)

- a first vote within the Union of Village Organisations,
- a second vote within the District development committee (this is a committee where the administration, Village Organisations and donors are equally represented.)
- a third vote in district parliament (*majlis*).

This procedure is designed to minimise the risks of one agency taking over, and to ensure the participation of all relevant actors.

However, such a procedure has significant drawbacks:

Firstly, there are too many bodies involved. The more bodies that are involved, the more difficult is it to build a winning coalition. It may be difficult for a project to “survive” all three votes, and it may be, on the other hand, very easy to “sink” a project. Efficient decision-making gets very difficult.

Secondly, when a project has to pass so many hurdles, there is a risk that only projects that hurt nobody ever get approved. Such projects are usually not the best ones.

Thirdly, given the actual capacities of the actors involved, such a procedure will put the government agencies at a clear advantage vis-à-vis the Village Organizations, for two reasons: One, government agencies at the district level are in a better position to lobby than representatives from the villages. Second, as in all post-soviet countries, the local executive always controls the local parliament. Thus, the third vote in the parliament would almost certainly go the executive’s way.

Hence, the checks and balances in-built in the proposed voting procedures would most certainly not work.

Summary of Risks

MSDSP is one of the largest, most effective and most respected organisations in Tajikistan. As it keeps growing both functionally and spatially, we recommend that MSDSP carefully

considers its responsibility. MSDSP must be aware that by significantly contributing to increased social security in Tajikistan it paradoxically helps society to reach a stage of development when the risk of violent conflicts increases. Therefore, a coherent strategy is needed in order to deal with the risk.

Among the “common” risks that we may expect to become virulent are:

1. MSDSPs activities increase the relative dependence on external donors. If these inputs are abruptly reduced, then the consequence might be bitter conflict.
2. MSDSPs activities increase the capacity for collective action of communities. In an environment where the state is (at the local level) absent, there is a need to think about checks and balances.
3. The decision-making process in the Village Organisation sheds light on cleavages and conflicts that used to be dealt with out of sight of the general public. Open conflict and even more so “openly losing a conflict” can be risky.
4. Institutional change produces winners and losers. Discontent among groups whose influence in the village decreases may lead to tensions.
5. MSDSP activities may weaken traditional institutions. When those institutions that traditionally deal with mediation and conflict management lose their grip on society, the risk for conflict may increase. The situation seems especially tense when traditional mediators lose influence, and the state is (not yet) in place as an alternative to social control.
6. MSDSP is planning to start working in multi-ethnic regions. In a multi-ethnic environment, all of the above mentioned issues apply even more.
7. Supplanting the state is always risky. There is no alternative to a legitimate state monopoly on violence. Ironically, MSDSP success may lead to a situation when growing and unrealistic expectations of the population and growing “jealousy” on the part of the state apparatus will make it very difficult to remain impartial and apolitical.
8. MSDSPs activities increase food security and in general social security. A continuous modestly growing income leads to growing expectations about the future. Usually, expectations grow quicker than real income. The widening gap between slowly growing incomes and quickly growing expectations is conflict prone.

With regard to organisational reforms:

9. Decentralisation of decision making processes in a situation when resources come exclusively from external donor organisations may prove dysfunctional: It may lead to increased competition and lobbying between the beneficiaries about scarce resources.
10. Organisational reforms that lead to increased competition between communities are risky. The creation of Unions of Village Organisations in every district promotes competition between these Unions. It will be especially risky when MSDSP starts to operate in regions where the population is heterogeneous.
11. Organisational reforms that increase need for lobbying by beneficiaries for scarce resources may lead to higher overall costs and thus reduced efficiency of the donor activity.
12. Complicated decision making processes may lead to inefficiency, lack of transparency and put government agencies at a clear advantage vis-à-vis the Village Organizations.

Recommendations

In general, the consultants feel that MSDSP's is, given its track record, its human resources, its high reputation and its presence at the local level in a unique position to significantly contribute to tolerance promotion and conflict prevention. The consultants also feel that MSDSP clearly underestimates its potential impact on stability/conflict. Given the fact that MSDSP is a powerhouse of institutional change at the local level and that it is a major resource provider, the consultants feel that MSDSP should increase its awareness of its impact on conflict / stability.

1 MSDSP should increase its in-house capacities with regard to conflict monitoring and information gathering and analysis.

The organisation is present at the local level. It is in a unique position to gather information at the local level which may serve as indicators of early warning. In order to efficiently do so,

MSDSP needs to develop a structured procedure to gather relevant data (see chart 2, page 33). It should at least develop a list of indicators that are checked upon on a regular basis in all regions where MSDSP operates. **It is of utmost importance that such a structured monitoring is fine-tuned to regional specificities!** The regional differences between the regions of operation (Pamir, Khatlon and Garm) require a tailored approach.

First steps in this direction have already been taken: In 1999, MSDSP conducted an exercise on Village Institutional Mapping in Gorno-Badaghshan. Such a mapping is a useful basis for developing a system of monitoring. Mapping local institutions should, however, focus on the potential of local institutions (including the newly introduced VOs) in processing arising conflicts. In order to analyse the capacities of informal local institutions to deal with conflicts a sensitive approach is needed since conflict is in most cases not openly

There exist numerous „early-warning-projects“ for Central Asia. See for example FAST at www.swisspeace.org/fast/.

However, they all focus on the macro-level (state and interstate level). They are, as a rule, blind to regional or local conflict dynamics. Treating the regional and local level as a black box is dangerous.

An exception is a GTZ-sponsored pilot project currently underway in the South Caucasus, where a team of local researchers develops such a monitoring system at local level.

displayed. The profile of MSDSP suggests that the analysis should be developed from the way decisions are taken in different institutions regarding the organisation of important resources and how existing institutions interact with this. To date it appears that very little is known about the *realpolitik* in and between villages.

In 2003, the Community Development Unit distributed a manual for Conducting Conflict Management Seminars at the Local-level (MSDSP 2003, January). This is another very useful tool for raising awareness on the importance of conflict management. However, both the Village Institutional Mapping project and the project for Conducting Conflict Management Seminars primarily address conflicts *within* a village and the latter is functional only when conflicts are already out in the open or at least in public display. Of potentially greater risk are conflicts that emerge between villages or between larger groups and are hidden from public discussion/awareness. This aspect should also be taken into consideration.

Increasing in-house capacities with regard to monitoring and information gathering does not come cost free. MSDSP staff should not be charged with yet another activity that they have to conduct along with the “usual” work. Rather MSDSP should explicitly raise funds for additional resources for training, staff and materials for developing a monitoring and information system focusing on local conflict processes.

2 MSDSP should increase its in-house capacities with regard to Impact Assessment

The consultants feel that MSDSP should develop in-house capacities for analysing the potential impact of its activities on conflict and on peace opportunities. This is especially important when MSDSP's activities are moving away from humanitarian assistance to broader social development assistance, and when MSDSP starts working in heterogeneous, multi-ethnic environments.

We propose that MSDSP acquires in-house capacities for conducting high quality **Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments**.

The consultants feel that MSDSP is aware of its impact on the village level and designs its activities on that level taking into account the Do-No Harm-imperative! However, MSDSP's activities also affect the district and regional level, especially when the Unions of Village Organisations come into being.

At current, MSDSP discusses three major issues: its possible exit options, its link with state agencies and the right measure of decentralisation

Any such change should be subject to a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment.

At the very least, some criteria should be developed as to when the implementation of these changes is low-risk. For example, the consultants feel that linking up with state agencies at the regional level is much needed, but it should happen only after the local parliaments have developed a measure of independence from the executive and the executive has developed a measure of accountability to the parliaments.

Decentralisation of decision power with MSDSP's activities is much needed, but it should only happen when at least a certain amount of resources that are to be divided originate at the regional level. Decentralisation of decision making to local units that remain dependent on highly centralized resource flows does not work.

Decentralisation of decision making must not promote inter-regional competition!

By **impact assessment**, we mean a systematic analysis of the effects of an intervention on the social and physical environment. Impact assessment is used to describe both ex-ante and ex-post studies of such effects.

A **Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment** refers to an analysis which helps improve the design, conduct and evaluation of development work in conflict prone areas and provide a means for evaluation the potential for peace building.

(Definitions follow Gaigals, C., with Leonhardt, M., 2001, Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Development. (Saferworld; International Alert and International Development Research Centre)

3 MSDSP's activities should strengthen internal policing capacities in the village

MSDPS should also consider that, in many places, it is operating in a virtually stateless environment. In a situation when the state is virtually absent, it is of utmost importance that local societies retain capacities to “punish” activities that endanger stability. Social research shows that societies that are capable of controlling their own hot-heads are significantly safer from conflict than other societies. In other words: A village may not be able to influence the policies at the national level. It may not even be able to influence the policies of the neighbouring village. But it may control its own potential aggressors, and this makes a society overall safer.

There are many ways of supporting “**internal policing**”. (Rewarding good attitudes, attributing shame to bad attitudes, prompting consensus on what is bad behaviour; training binding procedures; strengthening the positions of authoritative mediators). MSDSP's activities must be designed in a way that this crucial capacity for internal policing is not endangered, but rather strengthened!

4 MSDSP's Community Development Unit (CDU) should develop a coherent strategy for implementing conflict prevention measures

We propose that the Community Development Unit of MSDSP be charged with acquiring the required capacities at monitoring and impact assessment. Subsequently, the CDU then develops a coherent strategy for implementing conflict prevention measures.

5 MSDSP's Community Development Unit CDU should create synergies and clever side effects:

Tasks 1-4 require additional investments. However, much can be gained by creating synergies and by designing clever “side-effects”. MSDSP has shown this by holding a **Community-to-Community Conference (C2C)** in Garm. One of the major benefits (although this was not the objective) of this conference was that people with different regional backgrounds met in a region that was for some perceived as a “hostile” region. The reaction of the participants showed that they very much welcomed the opportunity of meeting up with “the other”.

Another idea on how to create side effects is the **internship-programme**: The consultants propose an internship tandem-programme: two interns (one local, one foreigner) are trained

by MSDSP and then work for MSDSP in the regions. The local interns could be drawn from the students of the Central Asia University, the interns from abroad could be found at western universities. The interns would then assist MSDSP with conflict monitoring at the local level. They would gather the data that is needed for the early warning system. The benefits of such a programme would be:

- MSDSP gets much-needed data
- Interns are trained in skills that are needed in Tajikistan. MSDSP interns increase their value on the local job market, and MSDSP gets a pool of trained people.
- There is a mutually benefiting learning exchange between the local intern and the western intern.
- The local intern together with the western intern would work in a region that is not the home region of the local intern. Such contacts may lead to reduction of prejudice between “town” and “village” and between different regions.

Road Map: Towards Tolerance Enhancing Projects in Central Asia

We have argued that GTZ and its implementing partners working in Central Asia should

- (1) increase their capacities for analysing **local** conflict processes and **local** problems connected to intolerance.
- (2) drawing on this, capacities should be developed for the identification measures for promoting tolerance and preventing conflict.
- (3) GTZ and its implementing partners should increase their in-house capacities for measuring the impact of the implemented projects. This serves both as a **early –warning system on local level** and as **an Impact Assessment**.
- (4) **All three activities should in the first place be integrated in ongoing projects. We suggest therefore to “update” ongoing projects with an additional conflict & tolerance dimension.**
- (5) In addition, the results of (1) and (2) may point to the fact that certain issues of conflict & tolerance are not or cannot be covered by updating ongoing projects, and consequently **new projects** need to be developed. The development of new projects is facilitated by the results of (1), (2) and (3).
- (6) It should be thoroughly checked which results of 1 – 4 (knowledge about localised conflicts; identified measures; methods of impact assessment and local conflict monitoring; new project initiatives) can be applied to regions / projects in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan or other Central Asian countries

The principle organisation of “feeding” tolerance and conflict management capacities, tailored to local knowledge of real life issues, into ongoing development initiatives, is pictured in chart 1 (page 33):

Existing situation: As a side effect of implementing and monitoring existing projects valuable information on problems and potentials is gathered on the ground anyway. This information is usually collected and documented on regional level and analysed according to the objectives of the project on central level (the level where the decision on financing of projects is taken in the first place).

How to proceed: In order to include the aspects of conflict processing competency and tolerance building into project creation, monitoring and evaluation a principle decision has to be taken at the central level, identifying the issue. Development initiatives covering rather different regions in Tajikistan and beyond need then to conduct a an assessment focused on both regional and local practise in terms of dealing with conflict and tolerance related issues.

This baseline survey on the institutions, resources, differences, ideologies and actors that matter would then be analysed for **clusters of informal politics of local communities**. If


conducted well this analytical clustering enables the central level to develop a catalogue of indicators, tailored to local needs and risks, to be included into the procedure of project creation, monitoring and evaluation.

By including those indicators in a transparent fashion into the routine of project design, funding, monitoring and evaluation the results of the analytical process return to the regional and local level.

Most importantly, this would not be a linear, one time investment in local knowledge and procedure development: adapted (added value in tolerance and conflict competency) project implementation would serve as instrument not only for project evaluation but also for tracing the relevant social developments with regard to conflict processes and tolerance building (or deterioration) on the ground and over time. The mechanism at central level that developed the indicators from the local analysis would have to be designed in a fashion that enables it to “digest” the feedback from local process tracing and adapt the indicators and procedures accordingly.


Chart 2 illustrates the same process taking objectives 1-5 of Angebot 2002.3652.1² and MSDSP as regional and local implementation partner for GTZ as an example.

² Fastenau 2002



Time-sequences: process of integrating local conflict analysis and tolerance indicators into project implementation

Chart_1



Chart_2

In the next sections we discuss 9 priority areas where, in our view, tolerance and conflict related projects could be developed. At the end of each section we provide a table that contains five questions:

1. Is additional analysis and research needed?
2. Is an integration / up-date with of ongoing projects possible?
3. Measures?
4. Is there a need for new projects?
5. Are proposed measures applicable in other Central Asian regions?

These tables serves only as a starting point for further idea-generation. We provide some of the answers, drawing on the result of our fieldtrip and on our previous experience in post-Soviet and Central Asian regions. However, this table must seen as a first step only.

Clusters of Authority in Rural Areas

Clearly, more basic research is needed in order to identify **clusters of authority** in different regions of Tajikistan. We need a better understanding who governs how in the regions; on what immaterial and immaterial resources ruling networks base their power; how this authority is linked to central networks; what authorities and institutions are in place for self-policing, facilitation and mediation.

We also need a better understanding of which groups are excluded from this authority, and we need more information about “spoilers”, that is about authorities and institutions that have a vested in interest in keeping the status quo and that have the capacity to “spoil” projects. A stakeholder analysis of all players is needed. Ideally, this information sums up to a typology of “clusters of authority” in rural areas that then can be used to design tailor-made projects.

Since modes of governance in Tajikistan vary greatly between regions, a regional analysis is needed.

Additional Analysis&Research needed?	Yes
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Up-date of ongoing projects possible?	Internship programmes, linking VO, MSDSP, Central Asian University and Western scholars. See in this report page 29
Measures?	MSDSP is in a unique position to gather this information
Need New Projects?	To be explored
Applicable to - Local Level; - Regional Level; - National Level, Other - Central Asian States	We suggest to do an analysis of clusters of authority in all regions where activities take place!

Conflict Monitoring

GTZ and its implementing partners in Central Asia should increase in-house capacities with regard to conflict monitoring on the local level. Most early warning programmes monitor the national level. However, violent conflict may start at the regional and even local level. Given the fact that GTZ and its implementing partners target in the first place the local level and implement rapid institutional change, a conflict monitoring at the local level is even more imperative.

Such a monitoring needs to be fine-tuned to regional specificities, taking into account (in the case of Tajikistan) the regional differences between the regions of operation (Pamir, Khatlon and Garm).

Increasing in-house capacities with regard to monitoring and information gathering does not come cost free. GTZ and its implementing partners should explicitly raise funds for additional resources for training, staff and materials for developing a monitoring and information system focusing on local conflict processes.

GTZ headquarters has already accumulated impressive knowledge of how to conduct conflict monitoring in general. (Cf. Leonhardt 2001a, and Leonhardt 2001b). For a regional monitoring, however, indicators to be monitored need to be developed or adapted from similar ongoing projects in sub-regions of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.

We would like to stress that it is not sufficient to monitor only scarcity of resource. Of much greater importance is a descriptive, qualitative monitoring of how society perceives this resource competition and what abilities, tools and traditions a society has in order to deal with competition. Given the fact that the state is either absent or corrupted, the burden of facilitation, mediation and social control lies with informal institutions and with international organisations. The action and impacts of these institutions must also be considered.

Additional Analysis&Research needed?	Yes
Up-date of ongoing projects possible?	MSDSP –Community Development Unit is currently concerned with strengthening its capacities on conflict monitoring
Measures?	Train MSDSP –Community Development Unit;
Need New Projects?	To be explored
Applicable to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local Level; - Regional Level; - National Level, Other - Central Asian States 	We suggest to strengthen conflict monitoring capacities of all agencies on a regional level (for example, GTZ office in Batken, MSDSP oblast offices,)

Impact Assessment

Impact assessment is a systematic analysis of the effects of an intervention on the social and physical environment. It helps improve the design, conduct and evaluation of development work in conflict prone areas and provide a means for evaluation the potential for peace building. The consultants feel that GTZ and its implementing partners should develop in-house capacities for analysing the potential impact of their activities on conflict and on peace opportunities. This is especially important when activities are moving away from humanitarian assistance to broader social development assistance, and when activities are undertaken in complex, multi-ethnic and/or border regions.

For any proposed activities, there should be an impact assessment made. In case that an activity could increase the risk for conflict, there should be formulated precise preconditions and criteria as to when the implementation of these changes is low-risk.

With regard to the proposed organisational change of MSDSP, we have for example suggested that linking up with state agencies at the regional level should happen only after the

local parliaments have developed a measure of independence from the executive and the executive has developed a measure of accountability to the parliaments; decentralisation of decision power with MSDSP should only happen when at least a certain amount of resources that are to be divided originate at the regional level; and decentralisation of decision making must not promote inter-regional competition.

Additional Analysis&Research needed?	Depends on the activities
Up-date of ongoing projects possible?	All ongoing projects should be subject to an impact assessment
Measures?	Train MSDSP –Community Development Unit
Need New Projects?	No
Applicable to - Local Level; - Regional Level; - National Level, Other - Central Asian States	All ongoing projects should be subject to an impact assessment

Internal policing capacities in the village

Rural areas in Tajikistan and in wide areas of Central Asia are a virtually stateless environment. In a situation when the state is absent, it is of importance that local societies retain capacities to “punish” activities that endanger stability. Social research shows that societies that are capable of controlling their own hot-heads are significantly safer from conflict than other societies. Internal policing at the local level may not influence the politics at the national level. However, if a sufficient number of rural communities is able to contain their own hot-heads, then the spread of all out mass violence is not likely.

There are many ways of supporting internal policing: Rewarding good attitudes; attributing shame to bad attitudes; prompting consensus on what is bad behaviour; training binding procedures; strengthening the positions of authoritative mediators.

We need to know when and how mechanisms of self-policing are changing, and when and how they can be influenced by international donor organisations. We assume that the high regional diversity requires regionally focused analysis of the formal and informal institutions that are capable of self policing.

Additional Analysis&Research needed?	Yes
Up-date of ongoing projects possible?	To be explored
Measures?	Strengthen formal mechanism of policing by strengthening judiciary Strengthen informal mechanism of self-policing
Need New Projects?	To be explored
Applicable to - Local Level; - Regional Level; - National Level, Other - Central Asian States	Local Level. Regional level: To be explored

Migration

The issue of migration deserves a special remark. About 1 million Tajiks, mostly younger men, have opted to work abroad. On the one hand, this adds in the short run to stability, because large numbers of potentially unruly young men earn their bread abroad and send money back home. On the other hand, in the long run this situation may cause social unrest, should, for example, Russia suddenly close its labour market for Tajik workers, or should the large and economically important segment of society feel that they are excluded from the political process at home.

Under what circumstances does the huge work migration increase or reduce stability in Tajikistan? Is this large segment of society a threat or an opportunity for tolerance and stability promoting measures?

Additional Analysis&Research needed?	Yes
Up-date of ongoing projects possible?	To be explored
Measures?	To be explored
Need New Projects?	To be explored
Applicable to - Local Level; - Regional Level; - National Level, Other	Start at studying impact of work migration on local level

Healing

(Cf. Scherg 2003, and Lingnau & Grossmann 2002)

Tajik society is a fragile post-war society that has for the moment chosen to “forget” the war-traumas, grievances and irredentism are being tabooed. But how sustainable are the current - official and individual - strategies of avoidance, oblivion and tabooing with regard to the past? Does this strategy heal, suppress or breed conflict in the future? What are the perceptions on the war among the various groups today? Are perceptions structured regionally, by generations, by gender, by class or by world view?

International donor organisations work on issues on reconciliation and healing on the national level and initiated an support national institutions dealing with these issues. However, on the regional and local level, we could, not detect any such activities.

Fear, mistrust and prejudices between certain regions is high, especially between the regions that see themselves as “victims” and those that see themselves as “winners”. There is almost no information flow between the regions.

Reconciliation and tolerance go, in post-war societies, hand in hand. Whereas we are in no position to judge the risks that come along with the strategy of oblivion or to suggest ambitious projects, we nevertheless feel that fostering contact between regions may, as a side effect, be a good start.

Additional Analysis & Research needed?	To be explored
Up-date of ongoing projects possible?	Yes, by including inter-regional meetings and interaction
Measures?	inter-regional meetings and interaction
Need New Projects?	To be explored
Applicable to - Local Level; - Regional Level;	Regional level, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan: to be explored

- National Level, Other - Central Asian States	
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Linking Villages with the State

As the example of MSDSP shows, bringing the state back in and linking it to rural communities and to donor organisations is important. It is also very difficult. However, sooner or later it must be the state that is charged with exercising a legitimate monopoly on violence and guaranteeing transparent rules for justice, participation and representation. If this does not happen, then society will more and more retreat in a “amoral familism” (or, for that matter, amoral regionalism). This is conflict prone.

Rural space in Tajikistan is governed by a mixture of state institutions and informal institutions. Local governmental institutions (service providing, resource owning, and local self-government) are weakly institutionalised, chronically under funded or function only in “cooperation” with local networks of patronage. The jamoat, the first and lowest level of government and of state presence in Tajikistan is supposed to be the first link between society and the state. The jamoat is systematically under-funded. It has no budget of its own, it is dependent on the financial department of the district administration and even more so on the informal power structures that link local networks to central networks of patronage. The jamoat as such has thus no problem solving capacity whatsoever.

Development activities should seek to link with the state. They should also be aware that the state is at the time being hardly existent, corrupted, badly trained and not impartial. Smart investment in the state is needed!

Additional Analysis&Research needed?	To be explored
Up-date of ongoing projects possible?	Yes, for example by smartly designing the way the planned Unions of Village Organisations institutionally link to the state. See in this report page 19 (Schall 2002, August) UNDP Jamoat Development councils (MSDSP, UNDP 2002, November)

Measures?	Smart investment in the state Moral training for civil servants (in particular those who are in direct contact with the population)
Need New Projects?	To be explored
Applicable to - Local Level; - Regional Level; - National Level, Other - Central Asian States	Tajikistan: Village level, oblast level Other of Central Asia: To be explored

Education

Education is of crucial importance for the promotion of tolerance as a norm. There are two crucial issue in today's Tajikistan concerning education:

- (1) Schools must be refurbished in material terms (that is, building, water, heating systems and so on need to be repaired or newly build)
- (2) How can the desire for Islamic education of many be reconciled with educating the youth in the spirit of tolerance and respect of difference?

Additional Analysis&Research needed?	Yes, especially on informal Islamic education
Up-date of ongoing projects possible?	Yes. The VO often prioritise rebuilding of schools. Support, maybe give additional incentives
Measures?	Support rebuilding of schools. Support development of curricula that teach "practical" skills, needed in rural areas. Do not stigmatise informal Islamic teaching.
Need New Projects?	To be explored
Applicable to - Local Level; - Regional Level; - National Level, Other - Central Asian States	Local Level. It's the village schools that need be refurbished foremost.

Structured Meeting Places & Inclusion

Tolerance and intolerance are related to concepts of an imagined collective. The question of what groups “know” about the other and where they get this ”knowledge” is therefore highly relevant.

Tajikistan today lacks communication and information systems. People do not travel, and there is, as a rule, neither TV nor Radio nor newspapers in the village. Therefore there is no reliable routine of information exchange. In consequence, social and regional groups in Tajikistan do not know one another other than by way of prejudice and stereotype. The gap between regions and between urban and rural areas is immense.

In addition, Tajik society is a conservative society. Ways of knowing about each other are tightly controlled. The information flow between the generations, between sexes, and between individuals with a more secular-material and with a more spiritual-religious belief system is minimal. Most traditional institutions of conflict-processing relevancy exclude women and outsiders and most informal institution also limit access and participation in decision making to grown up and elderly local men.

We have identified five main barriers between groups: Regional; Urban - Rural; Gender; Generation; Secular vs. Religious.

Project activities should, either as main objective, or as side effect, create structured and inclusive meeting places, where different groups meet and engage in an interaction that is directed by norms and rules of inclusiveness

Additional Analysis&Research needed?	Yes, especially on the question of which barriers can seriously endanger stability and which could be used by organisers of violence?
Up-date of ongoing projects possible?	<p>Yes. VO procedures are per se a structured meeting place.</p> <p>The Village Organisations (as sponsored, for example, by MSDSP) are powerhouses of institutional change in the village, since they link help with mechanism of transparent decision making, accountability, and inclusiveness for women and young men.</p> <p>Youth-projects, in particular in minority regions (Kyrgyz in Jirgatal) may also be an option to be considered. (Cf. Schell-Faucon 2001)</p> <p>The VO often prioritise rebuilding structured meeting places such as schools and youth centres, or local bazaars. Support, maybe give additional incentives.</p> <p>Support youth centres</p> <p>Support inter-regional meetings and cooperation within GTZ and/or MSDSP activities</p>
Measures?	Create structured and inclusive meeting places, where different groups meet and engage in an interaction that is directed by norms

	and rules of inclusiveness
Need New Projects?	To be explored
Applicable to - Local Level; - Regional Level; - National Level, Other - Central Asian States	Local: Youth, gender, secular – non-secular Regional: Urban-Rural; Regional

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